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Abstract 
 
Pacta sunt servanda is a fundamental legal principle, which states that agreements must be kept. Thus, 
various wrongs, including breaches of contracts, entitle one to the most common remedy at common law: 
an award of damages. The basic principles that govern the assessment of contract damages are taught to 
students in every Law School. However, the application of those principles is not always easy because 
careful attention has to be paid to the individual circumstances of each case.  
 
The conclusion that the courts must strive to achieve is compensation of claimants for the actual loss 
sustained, in order to place them in the same position they would have been in if the contract had been 
performed. This paper argues that in a recent decision of the High Court of Australia in Clark v Macourt, 
the claimant was put in a position superior to that she would have been in if the contract had been 
performed. It summarises and questions the various parts of the decision to show that the million-dollar 
award over compensated the claimant.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Key Words: Breach of warranty — Compensatory principle — Contract damages — Date 
of assessment — Mitigation   
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I Introduction 
 
This paper examines the decision of the High Court of Australia (HCA) in Clark v 
Macourt, which was delivered on the 18 December 2013.1 The subject matter of the case 
was described as having a “peculiar” or “unusual” nature, being a stock of frozen donor 
sperm.2 Macourt was ordered to pay $1,246,025.01 for a breach of warranty by his 
fertility clinic. The contract price was a mere $386,950.91. 
 
In summary, the case is about first principles that govern the award of damages in breach 
of contract cases. In particular, there are two approaches that have emerged from the case. 
On one hand, the primary judge’s approach gained support from the majority in the 
HCA,3 and on the other hand, the approach of the New South Wales Court of Appeal 
(NSWCA) gained some, but not full, support from the dissenting judge in the HCA.4 
 
The main suggestion of the paper is that the Clark v Macourt majority decision should 
not be followed if a similar case arises in New Zealand or any other jurisdiction. It is 
agreed by many, if not all, that the compensatory principle is the ruling principle in 
breach of contract damages cases, yet its application has caused much judicial 
disagreement.5 Arguably, Clark v Macourt is another case where the compensatory 
principle was applied incorrectly. More specifically, the HCA majority failed to apply the 
law on mitigation correctly. As a result, Clark was placed in a position superior to that 
which she would have been in had the contract been performed. Thus, it is suggested that 
the approach of the NSWCA, despite some difficulties of its own, is the better approach 
to follow in a similar fact scenario. 
 
 
  
1  Clark v Macourt [2013] HCA 56, (2013) 304 ALR 220 [Clark HCA]. 
2  At [68] per Gageler J dissenting and [75] per Keane J. 
3  St George Fertility Centre Pty Ltd v Clark [2011] NSWSC 1276 [Clark NSWSC]. 
4  Macourt v Clark [2012] NSWCA 367 [Clark NSWCA]. 
5  See David Winterton “Money awards substituting for performance” (2012) 3 LMCLQ 446 at 447. 
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II Facts 
 
The story begins in early 2002 when the appellant, Clark, entered into a Deed with St 
George Fertility Centre (the vendor), whereby she agreed to purchase various assets for 
her own clinic. Macourt, being the only director and controller of St George, was the 
guarantor under the Deed. Both parties were registered medical practitioners who 
specialised in Assisted Reproductive Technology (ART) practices, also known as 
artificial insemination in layman’s terms.6 One of the most important assets acquired 
under the Deed was frozen donated sperm — the subject matter of litigation. 
 
Shortly after opening her clinic, Clark acquired sperm from donors and from various 
other suppliers such as Westmead Fertility Centre, Queensland Fertility Group and Cryos. 
Once Clark purchased the various assets under the Deed, the vendor delivered 3,513 
straws of sperm along with the other assets. St George provided a warranty that “the 
consents, screenings tests … and identification … of donors of Sperm … have been 
conducted in compliance with the [regulatory] guidelines”.7 The purchase price for all of 
the assets under the Deed was to be calculated and paid in three annual instalments as 
stated in cl 2a:8 
 
In respect of each of the calendar years 2002, 2003 and 2004, 15% of the amount by 
which the purchaser’s gross fee income exceeds 105%, 110% and 115% respectively 
of the fee income of the purchaser for the calendar year 2001. 
 
As established at 8 April 2005, the purchase price that Clark had to pay was $386,950.91. 
Up until 2005, Clark had only used 504 of the vendor’s straws because a large number of 
the straws delivered had to be discarded. Clark explained that the primary reason for the 
destruction of sperm was the paucity of records provided by the vendor, making the 
remaining sperm unsafe to be used in treatment.9  
  
6  Clark NSWCA, above n 4, at [24]. 
7  Clark HCA, above n 1, at [83]. 
8  At [43] and [80]. 
9  Clark NSWSC, above n 3, at [28]. 
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Another critical event happened in 2005. There was a change to the Reproductive 
Technology Accreditation Committee (RTAC) Guidelines of the Fertility Society of 
Australia, which introduced a number of new requirements.10 This change had caused 
Clark to purchase the only ethically suitable replacement sperm from Xytex, an American 
company, because her usual suppliers’ sperm was no longer suitable once the new RTAC 
Guidelines had been issued.  
 
Also, as a result, Clark charged her patients an amount no greater than the amount she 
herself spent to acquire the donated sperm. Ethically, practitioners were prohibited from 
making profits when using sperm for treatment purposes. Clark’s patient fee covered 
most of the cost and expense to her in acquiring the replacement sperm because Clark 
claimed there was always a “buffer” between the real costs to her and those she passed on 
to her patients.11 The meaning of this is taken to be that if the overall cost to Clark was A, 
she charged her patient price B (A>B) to ensure there was always a difference. Clark 
never wished to be viewed as making profits when using sperm in treatment, as that 
would have been unethical12 and later illegal as codified in a statute.13  
 
In March 2006, St George Fertility Centre issued proceedings against Clark for the 
outstanding purchase price amount of $219,950.91 under the Deed. In September 2008, 
Clark filed a counter-claim seeking damages from the vendor and Macourt for breach of 
various warranties, but mainly the suitability of donor sperm supplied by St George. It is 
important to reproduce the appellant’s pleadings, as it might have influenced the 
majority’s decision:14 
 
  
10  Australian Health Ethics Committee Ethical guidelines on the use of assisted reproductive 
technology in clinical practice and research (National Health and Medical Research Council, 
September 2004); and Clark NSWSC, above n 3, at [41] and [50]. 
11  Clark NSWCA, above n 4, at [39]. 
12  At [38]. 
13  At [38] and [39]; and Human Cloning for Reproduction and Other Prohibited Practices Act 2003 
(NSW), s 16. 
14  Clark HCA, above n 1, at [32] (emphasis added). 
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the damages ... are in the nature of compensation which, so far as possible gives her 
the benefit of her bargain under the Deed by giving her, so far as money is capable 
of doing so, something equivalent to the value of the worthless Sperm delivered to 
her, as opposed to damages to compensate her specifically for her outlay to Xytex 
(the amount actually paid and payable to Xytex being no more than evidence of an 
appropriate measure of damages). 
 
There are three points to note in regards to Clark’s claim. First, if literally read Clark 
asked the court to make an award of $0 because the value of the worthless Sperm would 
have realised nothing. Secondly, the Australian courts did not read the claim literally and 
instead the majority’s focus was to equate the damages amount to the cost of compliant 
replacement sperm. Thirdly, because of the wording of the claim and because of the 
court’s focus, the claim for damages was limited to the acquisition of compliant 
replacement sperm.15 It should be borne in mind that once sperm is acquired there are 
many other storage and treatment costs that are incurred by the medical practitioner.16 
However, Clark did not quantify these costs and thus, “they did not form part of her claim 
for damages”.17  
 
By the time of the hearing before the primary judge in 2011, Clark acquired 1,546 straws 
of replacement sperm from Xytex. Clark charged her patients a fee of $800 taking into 
account the replacement sperm purchase price “and the cost of the additional laboratory 
and clinical time necessary to manage Xytex donor sperm”.18 At the time of the trial, the 
fee increased to $930 per straw to cover the increases in Xytex price. There was expert 
evidence that:19 
 
Even at the lowest charge to patients (being $800 per straw) [Clark] would have 
recovered … $467,333 more than the amount she paid [to Xytex for 1,546 straws]. It 
was not suggested that in so doing Dr Clark was making a profit, for the last 
  
15  See Clark NSWCA, above n 4, at [41]. 
16  See generally at [26] and [27]. 
17  At [41]. 
18  At [33]. 
19  At [80]. 
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mentioned amount would have been expended by Dr Clark in storing and treating the 
Xytex sperm in her facility. 
 
III Procedural History 
A June 2010 — NSWSC 
 
In the NSW Supreme Court (NSWSC), Macready AsJ held that St George and Macourt, 
as the guarantor, were liable for breach of various warranties.20 This was based primarily 
on an admission made by Macourt that “‘sperm donor records were not maintained in 
each case as required’”.21 Note that the records were not maintained as required, but it 
does not follow that St George did not conduct its practices in the manner that was 
compliant with the guidelines at the relevant time.  Some of the passages in the later 
NSWSC judgment suggest that there is no evidence to prove that St George failed to 
conduct its practice in compliance with the guidelines; the evidence simply established 
that the records it passed to Clark were inaccurate.22 In other words, it is very likely that 
St George did comply with the RTAC Guidelines and it never breached its warranty. 
 
It is true, however, to say that St George breached an express clause of the contract when 
it failed to give patient records to Clark, which should have included “details … and 
sufficient information to allow identification in accordance with RTAC Guidelines”.23 
Nonetheless, Macready AsJ’s decision on the vendor’s breach of warranty and Macourt’s 
liability was the accepted norm that persisted throughout the later judgments. 
 
 
 
  
20  Clark HCA, above n 1, at [5]. 
21  At [87]. 
22  See Clark NSWSC, above n 3, at [38], [53] and [63]. 
23  Clark HCA, above n 1, at [84]. 
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B October–November 2011 — NSWSC 
 
Gzell J assessed the damages for the breach of warranty striving to compensate Clark for 
the vendor’s failure to deliver compliant straws.24 His Honour calculated how much, as at 
the date the contract was breached — date of delivery in 2002 — Clark would have had 
to pay to Xytex for the straws.25 Thus, the formula used by the Judge was a hypothetical 
purchase from Xytex less a hypothetical sale of the defective sperm that would have 
realised nothing.26  
 
His Honour only accounted for 1,996 straws of sperm because Clark admitted that in her 
normal course of practice she would have only expected to use 2,500 straws of sperm 
delivered and she had actually used up 504.27 Gzell J used the figures of September 2005 
when Clark made her first purchase of 30 Xytex straws at $15,334.46, which was then 
calculated to be $1,020,252.70 for 1,996 straws.28 Accounting for the fact that Xytex 
price might have been less in 2002, Gzell J in a “robust fashion” simply allowed for the 
interest to be added starting 29 September 2005; so no interest for the intervening three 
and a half years.29 Thus the overall amount awarded, including interest, was 
$1,246,025.01.30 It should be noted that Gzell J rejected Macourt’s arguments, put 
forward by his counsel, on Clark’s mitigation of the loss and betterment of Xytex stock.31  
 
After this decision, Macourt alone appealed to the NSWCA because St George had gone 
into liquidation.32 
  
24  Clark NSWSC, above n 3, at [48]. 
25  At [108]. 
26  Clark HCA, above n 1, at [51] and [52]. 
27  Clark NSWSC, above n 3, at [47] and [48]. 
28  At [108]–[111]. 
29  At [111]. 
30  Clark HCA, above n 1, at [88]. 
31  Clark NSWSC, above n 3, at [21] and [82]. 
32  Clark HCA, above n 1, at [78]. 
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C  December 2012 — NSWCA 
 
In the NSWCA decision, the Court made clear that the contract was for the sale of a 
business as opposed to the sale of goods.33 An interesting point made was that it was 
impossible to find the specific cost of St George sperm because of the way the purchase 
price formula was stated in the Deed.34 Accordingly, it was “patently clear that [Clark] 
could not ethically have charged her patients for the supply of such [St George] sperm” as 
she acquired under the contract.35  
 
Furthermore, the Court found that up to the date of trial Clark had mitigated her prima 
facie loss, Xytex replacement sperm cost, by charging her patients a fee covering that 
cost.36 Clark achieved mitigation to “the maximum extent allowed by the legal and 
ethical constraints under which she operated”.37 Therefore, Clark was only entitled to 
damages for that part of the overall replacement cost incurred that was not covered by her 
patients up to the date of trial, together with a capitalised value amount for that part of the 
overall cost that it could be expected Clark might not be able to recoup for the remaining 
number of straws she was still left to replace.38  
 
Thus, by allowing the appeal, Clark was awarded no damages because the replacement 
cost for 1,546 straws from Xytex was recouped and it was assumed that the replacement 
cost would continue on being recouped from her patients as Clark continues on sourcing 
the remaining straws from Xytex (1,996 – 1,546 = 450).39  
 
 
  
33  Clark NSWCA, above n 4, at [42]–[49]. 
34  At [66]. 
35  At [126]. 
36  At [112], [127] and [132]. 
37  At [127]. 
38  At [128]–[130]. 
39  At [128]–[133]. 
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IV A Note on the Regulatory Scheme 
 
At the time of the Deed, both Clark and Macourt were bound by ethical guidelines on 
ART introduced by the National Health and Medical Research Council in 1996.40 Some 
of the ethically unacceptable practices were to trade commercially in gametes or embryos 
and to pay donors an amount above their reasonable expenses.41 It is also important to 
note that a Commonwealth statute prohibited commercial trading of gametes or 
embryos,42 and this was also enacted in a NSW statute in 2003.43 Thus, when using donor 
sperm in treatment, a medical practitioner could not profit from it but was allowed to 
charge a fee that covered the acquisition and related costs.44  
 
It will be recalled that Clark admitted there was always a buffer between the real costs to 
her and those she passed on to her patients. However, the NSWCA made clear that Clark 
did not seek any damages for this difference, which must have included the extra 
expenses incurred by her for the storage and treatment of frozen donated sperm (ie related 
costs).45  
 
The amended RTAC Guidelines of 2005 introduced inter alia: a maximum family rule;46 
made it a requirement that “sperm donors had to consent to being identified by any 
children conceived by the use of their donor sperm”;47 and added provisions regarding 
counselling and consents.48 
 
 
  
40  At [24]; and National Health and Medical Research Council Ethical guidelines on assisted 
reproductive technology (1996). 
41  Clark HCA, above n 1, at [42]. 
42  Prohibition of Human Cloning for Reproduction Act 2002 (Cth), s 21. 
43  At [122]; and Human Cloning for Reproduction Act, s 16. 
44  At [33] and [69]. 
45  Clark NSWCA, above n 4, at [26], [27] and [41]. 
46  Clark NSWSC, above n 3, at [34]. 
47  At [41]. 
48  At [56]. 
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V The Compensatory Principle 
 
The most important principle that should always be reflected in each and every damages 
award for a breach of contract is the compensatory principle. Parke B in Robinson v 
Harman enunciated that:49  
 
The rule of the common law is, that where a party sustains a loss by reason of a 
breach of contract, he is, so far as money can do it, to be placed in the same 
situation, with respect to damages, as if the contract had been performed. 
 
The High Court of Australia has repeatedly affirmed this on various occasions.50 The aim 
is to substitute the expected performance of a contract with a monetary award —
claimant’s expectation interest — because that performance was lost due to the breach.51 
This award can also be described as expectation damages, which protects the expectation 
interest of the claimant.52   
A Recent Case Law 
 
In The Golden Victory, all members of the House of Lords agreed that the compensatory 
principle is the ruling principle of contract law damages, despite having a split of 3:2 as 
to the final result in the decision.53 For instance, Lord Bingham stated that “[the 
principle] has been enunciated and applied times without number and is not in doubt”,54 
  
49  Robinson v Harman (1848) 1 Exch 850 at 855, 154 ER 363 at 365.  
50  N Seddon, R Bigwood and M Ellinghaus Cheshire & Fifoot Law of Contract (10th ed, Lexis 
Nexis, NSW, 2012) at 23.6, n 17; and see eg Commonwealth v Amann Aviation Pty Ltd (1991) 174 
CLR 64 at 80 and Tabcorp Holdings Ltd v Bowen Investments Pty Ltd (2009) 236 CLR 272 at 
[13]. 
51  Jeannie Paterson, Andrew Robertson and Peter Heffey Principles of Contract Law (2nd ed, 
Lawbook Co, Sydney, 2005) at 412; and see David McLauchlan “Some Issues in the Assessment 
of Expectation Damages” [2007] NZ Law Review 563 at 564. 
52  Seddon, Bigwood and Ellinghaus, above n 50, at 23.6; and Paterson, Robertson and Heffey, above 
n 51, at 412 and 425. 
53  Golden Strait Corp v Nippon Yusen Kubishika Kaisha [2007] UKHL 12, [2007] 2 WLR 691 [The 
Golden Victory]. 
54  At [9]. 
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and Lord Scott stated that “[t]he fundamental principle governing the quantum of 
damages for breach of contract is long established and not in dispute.”55 The majority’s 
underlying point was that “to ignore intervening events which have reduced [the] loss 
would lead to over-compensation”.56  
 
In The Glory Wealth,57 where the facts of the case were distinguishable from The Golden 
Victory,58 Teare J said:59 
 
Since the court is dealing with a question concerning the assessment of damages, and 
since there has been no clear decision of an appellate court which is binding on the 
court and pursuant to which the application of the contractual principles regarding an 
accepted repudiation has led to an award of damages which puts the innocent party 
in a better position than he would have been in had the contract been performed, I 
have concluded that the court should follow the compensatory principle endorsed by 
the House of Lords in The Golden Victory.  
 
All judges in Clark v Macourt, including those in the lower courts, agreed with the 
compensatory principle, and most mentioned its corollary: an award of damages should 
not place the plaintiff in a position superior to that which he or she would have occupied 
had the contract been performed.60 However, the problem in Clark v Macourt was, as 
Hayne J stated, the application of the ruling principle to the facts.61 As stated by David 
  
55  At [29]. 
56  Robert Stevens “Damages and the Right to Performance: A Golden Victory or Not?” in Jason W 
Neyers, Richard Bronaugh and Stephen GA Pitel (eds) Exploring Contract Law (Hart Publishing, 
Oxford, 2009) 171 at 196. 
57  Flame SA v Glory Wealth Shipping Pte Ltd [2013] EWHC 3153 (Comm), [2014] 2 WLR 1405 
[The Glory Wealth]. 
58  At [81]. 
59  At [84] (emphasis added). 
60  Clark HCA, above n 1, at [7] per Hayne J, [26]–[27] per Crennan and Bell JJ, [60] per Gageler J 
dissenting, and [106] per Keane J; Clark NSWCA, above n 4, at [99] per Tobias AJA; Clark 
NSWSC, above n 3, at [2] and [11] per Gzell J; and see generally Wertheim v Chicoutimi Pulp Co 
[1911] AC 301 (PC) at 308 per Lord Atkinson. 
61  Clark HCA, above n 1, at [8]. 
14  CLARK v MACOURT: PROPER COMPENSATION OR A ONE MILLION DOLLAR WINDFALL? 
 
McLauchlan, the “implementation [of the general principle] often provokes much judicial 
disagreement”.62   
B Correct Measure  
 
In order to give effect to the compensatory principle, various formulae have been 
concocted to put the plaintiff in the same position as if the expected performance had 
been rendered. The focus in this paper is solely on damages for defective goods because 
as a result of the breach of warranty by Macourt, the delivered straws of sperm were 
defective.  
 
It must be noted that there has to be actual loss suffered as a result of the breach, 
otherwise the claimant is only entitled to receive nominal damages.63 One way to 
distinguish between the types of loss is as follows: direct loss is the obvious loss of value 
of the promised performance calculated using the measure explained below, while 
consequential loss represents the loss that ensues as a consequence of the breach — for 
instance, loss of profits or further expenses incurred by the claimant.64  
 
Normally, expectation damages for the direct loss suffered are calculated on a difference 
in value basis.65 To achieve a proper award of compensatory damages, it is best to 
separate out the claimant’s actual position and its promised position and then calculate 
the difference between the two.66 In other words, the victim expected to receive goods at 
X value — expected position — but ended up receiving defective goods at the lower Y 
  
62  McLauchlan, above n 51, at 565.  
63  Seddon, Bigwood and Ellinghaus, above n 50, at 23.1; Lindy Willmott and others Contract Law 
(4th ed, Oxford University Press, South Melbourne, 2013) at [23.10] and [23.230]; and Philip 
Clarke and Julie Clarke Contract Law: Commentaries, Cases and Perspectives (2nd ed, Oxford 
University Press, South Melbourne, 2012) at 654 and 655. 
64  Paterson, Robertson and Heffey, above n 51, at 412–413; see generally McLauchlan, above n 51, 
at 585–590; and see generally Winterton, above n 5, at 449–450.  
65  Seddon, Bigwood and Ellinghaus, above n 50, at 23.6; Paterson, Robertson and Heffey, above n 
51, at 412–413; and JLR Davis (ed) Contract - General Principles: The Laws of Australia (2nd ed, 
Thomson Reuters, Sydney, 2012) at [7.9.180]. 
66  McLauchlan, above n 51, at 629. 
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value — actual position. In this situation, the formula for the difference in value, and thus 
the damages quantum, would be X – Y.  
 
It must now be highlighted and remembered that this formula is subject to various 
limiting principles, such as causation, remoteness and mitigation, which will be discussed 
later in the paper.67  
C HCA Majority Decision 
 
In contrast to NSWCA, all judges in the HCA thought that it made no particular 
difference whether the contract was for the sale of goods or a contract for the sale of a 
business.68 The majority in the HCA stated that Clark’s loss, or her expectation interest, 
was the value of what the promisee would have received if the promise had been 
performed.69 On the facts, Clark expected to use 2,500 straws of warranted stock of 
sperm but she could, and in fact did, only use 504, as a result of Macready AsJ’s decision 
on the breach of warranty.  
 
Thus, applying the actual and expected positions formulation, Clark was entitled to the 
difference in value between 1,996 straws of warranted stock (X) and 1,996 straws of 
defective stock (Y) delivered to her. The defective stock would realise no value because it 
was unusable, consequently Clark was entitled to the value of the 1,996 straws of 
warranted stock as her damages (X – 0 = X). As already mentioned, Gzell J used Xytex 
quotes from September 2005 to calculate the value of 1,996 straws of compliant sperm 
that St George should have delivered to Clark in 2002. The HCA majority judges were in 
full agreement with the findings of the primary judge.70 
 
  
67  Seddon, Bigwood and Ellinghaus, above n 50, at 23.2; and see also Paterson, Robertson and 
Heffey, above n 51, at 412–413. 
68  Clark HCA, above n 1, at [13] per Hayne J, at [30] per Crennan and Bell JJ, at [68] per Gageler J 
dissenting and at [108] per Keane J.  
69  At [10] per Hayne J, at [25] per Crennan and Bell JJ, and at [75] and [111] per Keane J. 
70  At [13] per Hayne J, at [25] per Crennan and Bell JJ and at [75] per Keane J. 
16  CLARK v MACOURT: PROPER COMPENSATION OR A ONE MILLION DOLLAR WINDFALL? 
 
In Keane J’s decision, with whom the other majority judges concurred,71 his Honour 
rejected the various arguments put forward by Macourt’s counsel. In particular, his 
Honour decided that the straws of sperm were definitely not valueless to Clark,72 and that 
at the time of completing the Deed the value of the business must have been substantially 
less because of the inferior sperm.73  As a consequence, Clark’s right to the bargain must 
have been infringed. Furthermore, just like Gzell J in his judgment, Keane J held that the 
law on mitigation was not applicable as it would “fail to address the claim which [Clark] 
actually made”74 and betterment discount was also inapplicable.75  
 
This paper argues that the majority judges have failed to apply the law on mitigation 
correctly. From their individual judgments, it seems like the Judges assumed that the 
calculation of the difference in value had to be assessed solely at the date of breach. This 
approach allowed them to disregard legally the events that followed post breach. As it 
will become more apparent below, the law on mitigation is actually built into the 
difference in value measure. Thus, in order for the ruling compensatory principle of 
contract law to have been given effect to, it was crucial for the events post breach in 
Clark v Macourt to have been properly analysed.  
D Dissenting Judgment 
 
Gageler J decided that Clark v Macourt did not fit in the standard category of breach of 
contract cases where there is a market, to which the normal measure of damages would 
apply, because:76  
 
The critical difference lies in the limited value to the buyer (Dr Clark) of the 
performance of the contract by the seller (the company) given the peculiar nature of 
  
71  At [23] per Hayne J and at [24] per Crennan and Bell JJ. 
72  At [114]–[124]. 
73  At [128] and [134]. 
74  At [128]. 
75  At [142]. 
76  At [68]. 
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the asset (frozen sperm) which the company was obliged to deliver under the 
contract. 
 
In other words, Gageler J suggested that St George sperm was always going to be used in 
the treatment of Clark’s patients in the normal course of her practice.77 As already 
mentioned, the ethical guidelines prohibited Clark from charging her patients a fee above 
her own acquisition costs and expenses;78 Clark could never make a profit on these 
assets.79 Therefore, because of this limited value of the asset and the fact that Clark would 
have never re-sold these assets in the market, the fundamental justification for the 
standard difference in value measure of damages was displaced. 
 
In particular, Gageler J emphasised Clark’s ability to use compliant sperm for the 
treatment of her patients.80 Any loss Clark suffered was the extra cost she incurred when 
she was forced to place herself in the position of using compliant sperm in treating her 
patients when St George sperm was found to be unusable.81 Thus, as the NSWCA held, 
Clark’s prima facie loss was the Xytex replacement cost. However, Clark had already 
recouped that cost by charging her patients a fee. If there was any part of the overall cost 
that Clark did not recoup from her patients for the 1,996 straws of sperm, then that would 
have been recoverable from Macourt.82 Thus, the measure adopted in the NSWCA was 
appropriate because:83 
 
… it yields an amount which places Dr Clark in the same position as if the contract 
had been performed so as to provide her with the expected use in the normal course 
of her practice of 1,996 straws of the frozen sperm delivered to her.  
 
  
77  At [70]. 
78  At [69]. 
79  At [69]. 
80  At [70]. 
81  At [71]. 
82  At [72]. 
83  At [72]. 
18  CLARK v MACOURT: PROPER COMPENSATION OR A ONE MILLION DOLLAR WINDFALL? 
 
It is important to note at this point that Gageler J did not discuss the law on mitigation, 
but instead held that the normal difference in value measure of calculating damages was 
displaced in view of the limited value of the stock to Clark.  
E Robert Stevens’ Rights Model 
 
This section of the paper discusses the “rights model” that has gained some support in 
academic literature.84 Stevens believes that the primary right to performance of a contract 
is created upon the voluntary entry into a contract,85 and so “[t]he infringement of the 
primary right to performance gives rise to a secondary right to damages which did not 
exist prior to breach.”86 Therefore, an award of substantial damages acts in substitution of 
the infringed right of the claimant; hence, the term Stevens uses — substitutive 
damages.87 
 
Substitutive damages require an objective assessment to be made at the moment of the 
infringement; thus, the date of assessment for the court is the date of breach.88 
Substitutive damages are available even if the loss as a matter of fact is not suffered 
because “damages seek to achieve the closest position to the wrong not having 
occurred”.89  Stevens believes that “it is a mistake to think that where no loss is suffered 
no claim for [substantial] damages is available”.90 In my view, this approach to damages 
goes against the fundamental compensatory principle, which states that actual loss must 
be proved by the claimants in order to give proper compensation to them. Stevens himself 
admitted that the “[s]ubstitutive damages are not compensatory for loss, properly so-
called, at all”,91 but act as “to vindicate the right to performance”.92 Consequently, 
  
84  Robert Stevens Torts and Rights (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007) at 2. 
85  See generally at 10. 
86  Stevens, above n 56, at 172. 
87  Stevens, above n 84, at 59.  
88  At 60 and 69. 
89  See generally at 59; and Stevens, above n 56, at 174. 
90  Stevens, above n 84, at 61. 
91  Stevens, above n 56, at 173. 
92  At 172. 
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Stevens believes that damages should be quantified according to the degree of 
seriousness of the infringed contractual right.93  
 
According to Stevens, consequential losses are also recoverable but, as opposed to being 
objectively assessed, they must be proved by the claimant.94 Thus, consequential losses 
are assessed at the time of the judgment.95 More importantly, the “breach of contract does 
not fall into the category of wrongs which require the proof of consequential loss before 
substantial damages will be awarded”.96 On this point, Stevens also emphasised that 
mitigation and remoteness are questions only to be discussed when calculating the 
consequential loss, but are not questions to be discussed when calculating the value of the 
infringed right.97 In other words, there is no need to inquire into mitigation or remoteness 
when the difference in value is assessed. 
F Criticism of Robert Stevens 
 
Andrew Burrows and James Edelman offer the main critique of the rights model, 
suggesting it is “a radical and novel reinterpretation of the law”.98 Burrows argues: (a) the 
“rights-based approach” would trigger a right to substantial damages for each and every 
wrong;99 (b) it contradicts the law on mitigation because post breach events would not be 
legally considered;100 (c) this in itself goes against courts’ practice that does inquire into 
events subsequent to the breach;101 (d) it does not leave any room for an award of 
nominal damages;102 and (e) it would be meaningless to assess the value of the right 
  
93  Stevens, above n 84, at 79. 
94  At 60. 
95  At 60. 
96  Stevens, above n 56, at 176. 
97  At 181. 
98  Andrew Burrows “Damages and Rights” in Donal Nolan and Andrew Robertson (eds) Rights and 
Private Law (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2012) 275 at 278. 
99  Andrew Burrows “Are ‘Damages on the Wrotham Park Basis’ Compensatory, Restitutionary or 
Neither?” in D Saidov and R Cunnington (eds) Contract Damages: Domestic and International 
Perspectives (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2008) 165 at 181. 
100  At 182. 
101  At 183. 
102  At 184. 
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without considering the consequential impact of infringement because there is an obvious 
overlap between damages for the infringed right and the compensatory consequential 
damages.103  
 
In addition, Edelman pointed out that the rights model causes one to be entitled to the full 
value of the right to a thing without any regard to the seriousness of the damage.104 In 
other words, placing too much focus on the value of the right that has been infringed 
would render the nature of that infringement and its consequences as irrelevant.105 
Moreover, the approach would lead to double recovery if the claimant is permitted an 
award of damages for the infringement of its right and for any consequential losses.106  
 
Robert Stevens has attempted to provide counter-arguments to his critiques. First, Stevens 
said that every wrong would not entitle the claimant to substantial damages because 
“[f]or some wrongs all that is actionable is consequential loss.”107 With respect, a 
substantial damages award is typically made up of consequential loss if the latter is 
proved.  
 
Secondly, Stevens argues that the law on mitigation would not be contradicted because 
the law does not apply to substitutive damages, but solely applies to consequential loss.108 
Once again, Stevens attempts to distinguish substitutive damages, which would ordinarily 
be calculated on the difference in value basis for defective goods, with consequential loss. 
This is incorrect, as this paper makes it clearer later, mitigation does apply to the 
difference in value calculation. Hence, logically the law on mitigation should always be 
analysed. 
  
103  At 184–185. 
104  James Edelman “The Meaning of Loss and Enrichment” in Robert Chambers, Charles Mitchell 
and James Penner (eds) Philosophical Foundations of The Law of Unjust Enrichment (Oxford 
University Press, New York, 2009) 211 at 219–220.  
105  Burrows, above n 98, at 280. 
106  Edelman, above n 104, at 220. 
107  Robert Stevens “Rights and Other Things” in Donal Nolan and Andrew Robertson (eds) Rights 
and Private Law (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2012) 115 at 128. 
108  At 129. 
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Thirdly, Stevens said there would still be room left for the nominal damages because the 
infringement of the right is a notional quantification exercise and, in fact, the infringed 
right may be valueless.109 With respect, this adds too much uncertainty and complication 
into law as it effectively begs the courts to create a spectrum of various rights’ values, 
some of which may be valueless according to Stevens. Moreover, an award of nominal 
damages already serves the role of acknowledging the claimant’s right to performance 
without any further proof of loss. Consequently, it is unnecessary to introduce a new 
exercise for the courts involving the task of putting a number on the value of the 
infringed right. 
 
Furthermore, Stevens disregards the overlap between the damages for the infringed right 
and damages for the consequential impact of the infringement by simply stating that “[a] 
wrong and its consequences are not the same thing.”110 This is perhaps a further 
explanation as to why substitutive damages and consequential loss are treated as separate 
by Stevens — they are simply not the same thing. 
 
Lastly, Stevens argues in reply to Edelman, that it is only the value of the infringement 
that is quantified in damages, as opposed to the full value of the right.111 With respect, 
this actually suggests that the consequences of the infringement must be taken into 
account to calculate the value of the infringement; as otherwise, it may be impossible to 
put a financial measure on the infringement at all. Hence, there is definitely an overlap 
between the infringed right and its consequences. Stevens further said that it is impossible 
to cumulate claims with respect to the infringed right and consequential losses because 
“[r]ecovery under one head reduces the damages recoverable under the other.”112 In my 
view, this statement adds further weight to the argument that there is an overlap between 
the infringed right and its consequences if they act as a see-saw: where if one goes up, the 
other comes down. 
  
109  At 131. 
110  At 132. 
111  At 127. 
112  At 128. 
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G Conclusion on the Compensatory Principle  
 
Robert Stevens’ rights model is possibly the best explanation for the majority’s award of 
damages in Clark v Macourt. Clark did not receive the warranted sperm, which she 
gained a primary right to upon entry into the Deed.  As a consequence, Clark’s right to 
performance was infringed and this in turn suggests that the million-dollar damages 
amount acted as a substitute for her infringed right. Moreover, the majority, consistently 
with Stevens’ approach, assessed these substitutive damages “at the time of the 
infringement”113 — the date of stock delivery in 2002 — because apparently, 
“[s]ubsequent events are irrelevant as the court’s task is not to calculate what actual loss 
has been suffered.”114   
 
This paper suggests that the rights-based approach is incorrect and ought not to be 
accepted, because it wrongly fails to take into account the ruling compensatory principle 
of contract damages, especially with respect to the difference in value calculation. 
Therefore, it is clear that by allowing an award of over a million dollars in damages in 
favour of Clark, the HCA majority did not give proper compensation to Clark, despite 
having mentioned the compensatory principle in every judgment. In fact, the story does 
not end at the point where the claimant receives an award for the infringement of his or 
her right on the difference in value basis. In legal reality, the contract damages have 
limitations placed on them because further elements like causation, remoteness and 
mitigation ought to be considered and applied to the facts of the case, so that proper 
compensation is given. In summary, the criticism of Stevens in the contract law context is 
valid, and as Burrows rightly said “[t]he novel ‘rights-based approach’ of Stevens … 
causes more problems than it solves.”115  
 
Overall, the majority in Clark v Macourt failed to give enough weight to the fact that 
Clark passed the cost of replacement sperm on to her patients. As a result, the majority 
  
113  Stevens, above n 56, at 182. 
114  At 182. 
115  Burrows, above n 99, at 185. 
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placed Clark in one million dollars superior position than if the contract had been 
performed. In other words, the majority did not adequately discuss or give any proper 
effect to the law on mitigation, which would have reduced the quantum of damages; so, it 
is thoroughly discussed next in this paper. 
 
VI The Law on Mitigation 
A The Three Rules  
 
McGregor on Damages sets out three rules that govern the law on mitigation.116 Firstly, a 
claimant is not permitted to recover for avoidable loss.117 Secondly, any expenses 
incurred by the claimant throughout the reasonable mitigating act are recoverable.118 
Thirdly, a claimant is prevented from recovering for avoided loss.119 It is the last of these 
rules that is discussed in this paper because, in agreement with NSWCA, it is suggested 
that Clark has avoided her prima facie loss by passing the cost of the replacement Xytex 
sperm on to her patients. In other words, Clark has fully mitigated her loss and, thus, she 
should not have been awarded $1,246,025.01.  
B Avoided Loss 
 
Avoided loss has been described as a “topic of great difficulty”120 and the law on the 
topic is “in a dreadful muddle”121 or “a bit of a jumble”.122 Nonetheless, this paper will 
attempt to explain what avoided loss encompasses and how it applies to Clark v Macourt.  
  
116  Harvey McGregor McGregor on Damages (18th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2009) at 7-003; 
and see generally Seddon, Bigwood and Ellinghaus, above n 50, at 23.41–23.43. 
117  At 7-004. 
118  At 7-005. 
119  At 7-006. 
120  Harvey McGregor “The Role of Mitigation in the Assessment of Damages” in D Saidov and R 
Cunnington (eds) Contract Damages: Domestic and International Perspectives (Hart Publishing, 
Oxford, 2008) 329 at 336. 
121  David McLauchlan “Expectation Damages: Avoided Loss, Offsetting Gains and Subsequent 
Events” in D Saidov and R Cunnington (eds) Contract Damages: Domestic and International 
Perspectives (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2008) 349 at 384. 
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The modern law on the duty to mitigate and mitigation originates from the decision of the 
House of Lords in British Westinghouse Electric & Manufacturing Co Ltd v 
Underground Electric Railways Co of London Ltd (British Westinghouse).123 The duty to 
mitigate is a misnomer, because the plaintiff would not strictly be liable for a failure to 
mitigate.124 On avoided loss, in British Westinghouse, Viscount Haldane said:125  
 
… when in the course of his business he has taken action arising out of the 
transaction, which action has diminished his loss, the effect in actual diminution of 
the loss he has suffered may be taken into account even though there was no duty on 
him to act. 
 
This is taken to mean that even if the claimant goes beyond his or her duty to mitigate, 
and in doing so reduces his or her loss, those benefits ought to be taken into account 
when assessing the damages. This is done because one must “look at what actually 
happened, and to balance loss and gain”.126 However, there is an important qualification; 
the act of the claimant or “[t]he subsequent transaction, if to be taken into account, must 
be one arising out of the consequences of the breach and in the ordinary course of 
business.”127 In other words, the transaction has to be a “part of a continuous dealing with 
the situation … and … not an independent or disconnected transaction”, so as not to be 
considered as res inter alios acta.128 
 
When discussing the avoided loss law, various authors in modern literature use the terms 
“collateral benefits”,129 “compensating advantages”130 or “offsetting gains”.131 According 
                                                                                                                                            
122  McGregor, above n 120, at 336. 
123  British Westinghouse Electric & Manufacturing Co Ltd v Underground Electric Railways Co of 
London Ltd [1912] AC 673 (HL) [British Westinghouse].  
124  Andrew Dyson “Recovery for Avoided Loss: Towards a New Account of Mitigation” (October 
2012) Social Science Research Network <www.ssrn.com> at 8. 
125  British Westinghouse, above n 123, at 689. 
126  At 691. 
127  At 690. 
128  At 692. 
129  McGregor, above n 120, at 337. 
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to Andrew Burrows, indirect compensating advantages are not deducted from the 
defendant’s damages bill but other compensating advantages may be deducted.132 Harvey 
McGregor discusses the topic using collateral benefits that are not discounted because 
they are res inter alios acta.133 David McLauchlan uses offsetting gains to denote any 
benefits or advantages accruing to the claimant post breach that must reduce the damages 
award.134  
 
In this paper, the term “offsetting gains” is used to describe any advantages or benefits 
that the claimant acquires directly as a result of any mitigating act. These offset the 
primary loss to some degree. For example, in Clark v Macourt, Clark has acquired Xytex 
sperm for treatment once she could no longer use St George sperm because of the breach. 
It was found by Gzell J that Xytex had provided more extensive information about their 
donors,135 and that Clark negotiated an exclusive deal with Xytex where she was the only 
purchaser in NSW.136 Furthermore, Clark had actually saved costs by acquiring 
replacement sperm in portions as when required instead of having to store the St George 
sperm even if the latter were compliant.137 The HCA majority should have properly 
considered these advantages Clark gained as a result of her mitigating act. 
 
This paper suggests that any other actions that are undertaken to avoid the consequences 
of the loss are all part of the avoided loss umbrella, or similarly a part of the bigger 
mitigation umbrella. However, an enquiry must be made whether or not the action or 
transaction is res inter alios acta. For example, in Clark v Macourt, the mitigating act was 
the acquisition of replacement sperm; but, it is further argued that Clark’s action of 
charging her patients a fee that covered the acquisition and related costs, was not res inter 
                                                                                                                                            
130  Andrew Burrows Remedies for Torts and Breach of Contract (3rd ed, Oxford University Press, 
New York, 2004) at ch 7. 
131  McLauchlan, above n 121, at 384. 
132  Burrows, above n 130, at ch 7. 
133  McGregor, above n 120, at 336–346. 
134  McLauchlan, above n 121, at 384. 
135  Clark NSWSC, above n 3, at [76]. 
136  At [77]. 
137  Clark NSWCA, above n 4, at [98]. 
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alios acta but actually a part of the act undertaken to avoid the consequences of Clark’s 
prima facie loss.  
 
The reason that the arrangement to charge her patients a fee was not res inter alios acta is 
because it was a part of a continuous dealing with the situation that Clark has found 
herself in after the breach. On the facts of the case, in 2005, Clark had begun acquiring 
Xytex replacement sperm in small portions whenever she needed it in treatment, and this 
is obviously interlinked with the fee that she was going to charge her patients for that 
particular treatment. As NSWCA made clear, “it was perfectly legal and ethical for 
[Clark] to so charge her patients”.138 In contrast, what Clark did not do on the facts was to 
go into the market to acquire the full amount of straws from Xytex (ie 1,996 straws) and 
then decide to enter into contracts with her patients for the treatment, in which case the 
fees charged to patients could be viewed as independent transactions. In other words, as it 
happened on the facts of the case, Clark’s mitigating act (ie the purchase of replacement 
sperm) and her charge made to the patients must be viewed as one and whole transaction 
that was definitely completed by Clark to avoid the consequences of the breach. In doing 
so, Clark had fully reduced her primary loss. 
C Andrew Dyson and Adam Kramer 
 
In their article, Dyson and Kramer analyse the compensatory principle, the law on 
mitigation and the difference in value measure to arrive at various conclusions, some of 
which are very important to the analysis of Clark v Macourt.  Dyson and Kramer argue 
that there is no such ‘breach date rule’ as discussed in many judgments.139 In fact, in 
order to determine the correct date of assessment in a case, it is necessary to understand 
the rationale behind the law on mitigation.140 Mitigation is the most important because it 
“is most often responsible for the mistaken belief in the existence of a breach date 
  
138  At [112]. 
139  Andrew Dyson and Adam Kramer “There is no ‘breach date rule’: mitigation, difference in value 
and date of assessment” (2014) 130 LQR 259 at 259–260. 
140  At 259. 
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rule”.141 Moreover, “[t]he key to resolving the date of assessment problem lies in 
understanding how the compensatory principle operates.”142  
 
First, “the difference in value measure is an application of mitigation where there is an 
available market”,143 or as McGregor calls it a “built-in” mitigation.144 This conclusion is 
in stark contrast to Stevens’ formulation of the substitutive damages (ie difference in 
value). He believes that questions of mitigation and remoteness are not relevant to the 
direct loss — or infringement of the primary right to performance as the author puts it — 
but are solely relevant when measuring damages for consequential loss.145 In opposition, 
Dyson and Kramer believe that the difference in value measure is not a “freestanding 
head of damages” which abides by its own rules, but like other measures it is subject to 
limitations. 146 
 
Secondly, where there is an available market, the mitigation norm is that  “it is reasonable 
to expect the claimant to have prompt resort to it for substitute performance or extrication 
from the breach”.147 Thus, the date of assessment should be the date when such 
opportunity arises for the claimant. The authors state that ordinarily once the defective 
goods are received, it is reasonable for the purchaser “to resort to the market as soon as 
possible to sell the defective goods and to purchase goods that conform to the contractual 
specification”.148 However, if the claimant is unaware of the breach at the time, then the 
delivery date is irrelevant because it is not reasonable for the claimant to have had resort 
to the market at that date.149 Therefore, it is only after the discovery of the defect that the 
date of assessment comes into play.  
 
  
141  At 260. 
142  At 261. 
143  At 269. 
144  At 269. 
145  Stevens, above n 56, at 181. 
146  Dyson and Kramer, above n 139, at 266. 
147  At 280. 
148  At 264. 
149  At 273. 
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Thirdly, “factual losses are recoverable unless the mitigation rule requires that the factual 
assessment of the breach position be displaced by the assumption that the claimant acted 
reasonably”.150 To explain this in a different way, where there is no need to assume that 
the claimant acted reasonably because the claimant did in fact act reasonably, the 
claimant may only recover its factual losses as evidenced at the date of trial; hence, 
nothing is recoverable if there are no factual losses. 
D HCA Majority Judgments 
 
Hayne J said that Clark did not gain any benefits from her purchase and use of 
replacement sperm, nor was she any worse off “than she was before she undertook those 
transactions”.151 Moreover, according to his Honour, simply showing that Clark could or 
did charge her patients a fee that covered her replacement sperm cost was irrelevant.152 
With respect, as a result of acquiring Xytex sperm Clark gained direct benefits — or 
offsetting gains — already mentioned above: an exclusive deal, saved expenses and 
extensive information on donors. Moreover, it is the whole underlying purpose of the law 
on avoided loss that any action taken to avoid the consequences of the breach that result 
in a reduction of the claimant’s loss must be taken into account; this includes an action of 
passing on the incurred costs to third parties, as long as the arrangement is not res inter 
alios acta — this was also discussed above with respect to Clark v Macourt. It is worth 
repeating Clark’s concession that the charges she made to her patients “equalled the 
acquisition and other costs incurred by her”.153  
 
Crennan and Bell JJ rejected the mitigation argument on the basis that Clark’s dealings 
with patients “did not avoid, or increase or diminish, the loss of her bargain for delivery 
of St George sperm which was compliant”.154 This, once again, has a strong link to 
Stevens’ approach, as if Clark’s right to her bargain was infringed causing her loss; thus, 
  
150  At 277. 
151  Clark HCA, above n 1, at [19]–[21]. 
152  At [22]. 
153  At [37]. 
154  At [37] (emphasis added). 
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the only focus was to compensate Clark using the difference in value calculation at the 
time of breach. This would allow one, and did allow the HCA majority, to disregard 
legally any events post breach. However, with respect, if “commonsense overall 
judgment”155 is applied when one looks “at what actually happened”156, it is clear that 
Clark’s loss — the replacement stock cost — was recouped from her own patients and 
thus, her loss was fully avoided. 
 
Keane J, in agreement with the primary judge,157 seems to be a strong proponent of the 
‘breach date rule’ because it would bring finality and certainty into commercial 
transactions.158 However, Dyson and Kramer clarify that there is no such thing as a 
‘breach date rule’ as long as one understands and applies the law on mitigation correctly. 
Neither is Keane J’s statement consistent with the view of the House of Lords in The 
Golden Victory.159  
 
Unsurprisingly, Keane J rejected the mitigation argument because it would “fail to 
address the claim which the appellant actually made”.160 Clark’s claim asked the court to 
compensate her for the loss sustained at the completion of the Deed.161 This, perhaps, 
sheds light as to why the HCA majority judges were so focused on the date of breach in 
2002, as opposed to considering events post breach in thorough detail. In other words, the 
majority did not truly inquire into Clark’s purchase of replacement sperm subsequent to 
the breach, the cost of which was also later recouped from her own patients. Their 
Honours simply used Xytex evidence to calculate what value Clark was entitled to back 
in 2002.  
 
  
155  Fulton Shipping Inc of Panama v Globalia Business Travel SAU (formerly Travelplan SAU) of 
Spain [2014] EWHC 1547 (Comm) at [64]. 
156  British Westinghouse, above n 123, at 691. 
157  Clark NSWSC, above n 3, at [18] and [19]. 
158  Clark HCA, above n 1, at [109] and [110]. 
159  See generally The Golden Victory, above n 53, at [63] and [64] per Lord Carswell. 
160  Clark HCA, above n 1, at [128]. 
161  At [128]. 
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As Dyson and Kramer explain, the difference in value should be assessed once the 
claimant has an opportunity to go into the market to get a substitute. On the facts, Clark 
purchased Xytex sperm as when it was required in her treatment starting September 2005. 
Therefore, the date of breach in 2002 was an incorrect date to assess the damages 
quantum. If using one of the conclusions from Dyson and Kramer’s article, there is no 
need to treat Clark as if she had acted reasonably because Clark did in fact act reasonably. 
Consequently, Clark was only entitled to recover her factual losses as evidenced at trial. 
It is clear from the NSWCA’s judgment that Clark passed the acquisition costs on to her 
patients and she herself conceded that point.162 When one looks “at what actually 
happened” and balances loss and gain, Clark has suffered no loss, so there was nothing 
left to compensate. 163 For an argument’s sake, there was the buffer difference that Clark 
was entitled to because her real costs were greater than what she charged her patients. 
However, as mentioned earlier, Clark never claimed these extra expenses in damages, 
thus, she was unable to recover them from Macourt. 
 
When discussing betterment, Keane J rejected the argument because there was no 
evidence to establish “extra profitability attributable to the use of Xytex sperm”.164 In 
deciding so, his Honour limited the law on betterment to the particular facts of British 
Westinghouse, where extra profitability was gained by the claimant because of the higher 
efficiency of the newly purchased replacement goods.  
 
With respect, this is incorrect because Clark acquired direct benefits from the superiority 
of Xytex stock when compared to warranty compliant St George straws. It is unnecessary 
to limit offsetting gains to situations where the benefits gained solely lead to claimant’s 
extra profitability. If properly understood, the requirement proposed by Viscount Haldane 
is that the benefits are taken into account if the action undertaken by the claimant leads to 
a reduction of his or her losses.165 Moreover, in Clark v Macourt, because of regulations, 
medical practitioners could not make any profit when using sperm in treatment. 
  
162  At [37]. 
163  British Westinghouse, above n 123, at 691. 
164  Clark HCA, above n 1, at [142]. 
165  British Westinghouse, above n 123, at 689. 
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Therefore, it is wrong to tell Macourt that there were no offsetting gains against Clark’s 
primary loss simply because there was no extra profitability, when in actual fact, no profit 
could be made from the sperm when it was used in treatment. Overall, the only matter left 
for the counsel would have been to properly quantify these offsetting gains, or put a 
number on them, so that this would have ultimately reduced the damages bill awarded 
against Macourt.   
 
VII Conclusion on Clark v Macourt 
 
Compensatory principle is the fundamental ruling principle that should be applied to each 
and every award of damages for breach of contract. I have attempted to show that the 
majority judges in Clark v Macourt did not apply the compensatory principle correctly to 
the facts of the case because their Honours failed to give proper attention to the law on 
mitigation. More specifically, Clark has recouped her replacement sperm costs from her 
patients, and in doing so she fully reduced her primary loss. Additionally, Clark gained 
direct advantages and benefits from the superiority of Xytex stock when compared to 
compliant St George sperm, which should have been properly treated as offsetting gains. 
As a result, because of a failure to apply the law on mitigation correctly, Clark was 
placed in a superior position, to the extent of over a million dollars, than if the contract 
had been performed. As Macourt’s counsel put it:166 
 
… the effect of the primary judge’s award of damages is that Dr Clark will have 
been reimbursed twice for the expense of purchasing replacement Xytex sperm: first 
by her patients and, secondly, by order of the court. 
 
As it was made more apparent, there is a strong link between the HCA majority reasoning 
and Robert Stevens’ rights model and his substitutive damages. The latter approach has 
attracted much valid criticism and, therefore, the HCA majority decision is deserving of 
the same fate. On one hand, the decision, being so consistent with Stevens’ approach, is 
“superficially attractive” because it advocates for the ‘breach date rule’ and a simple 
  
166  Clark NSWCA, above n 4, at [81]. 
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difference in value calculation exercise.167 Surely it may bring “finality and certainty to 
commercial dealings” as Keane J said.168 On another hand, the approach and the decision 
are “ultimately flawed” because the HCA majority judges paid little attention to the law 
on mitigation.169 Importantly, Dyson and Kramer emphasise that “the difference in value 
measure is an application of mitigation where there is an available market”, and thus, 
there is no ‘breach date rule’ properly so-called.170  In their Honour’s attempt to give 
proper effect to the compensatory principle, it was necessary for the HCA judges to 
analyse the law on mitigation in more detail. However, this was not done. 
 
Lastly, it will be recalled that Clark in her pleadings asked for “something equivalent to 
the value of the worthless Sperm”, which if read literally means she asked for an award of 
$0 because worthless sperm would have realised nothing.171 Ironically, Keane J stated 
that Clark “was entitled to frame her claim in the manner most advantageous to her, and 
to have that claim determined”.172 Their Honours did not determine that claim when they 
“erroneously compensated” Clark with $1,246,025.01, when she literally claimed $0 (a 
figure she arguably should have been awarded!).173 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
167  Burrows, above n 98, at 290. 
168  Clark HCA, above n 1, at [110]. 
169  Burrows, above n 98, at 290. 
170  Dyson and Kramer, above n 139, at 269. 
171  Clark HCA, above n 1, at [32]. 
172  At [103]. 
173  Clark NSWCA, above n 4, at [131]. 
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